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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established on 
17 July 1998 by a multilateral treaty signed in Rome by 120 States.1 The ICC 
Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002 after it had been ratified by 60 states.2  
 
Article 303 of the Rome Statute, provides a general definition for the mental 
element necessary to trigger criminal responsibility of individuals for serious 
violations under international humanitarian law.4 A person shall be criminally 
responsible and liable for a crime within the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court if the material elements of a ‘crime are committed with ‘intent 
and knowledge’.5 For the first time, international criminal Law does only 
confirm general requirement for international criminal liability but codifies the 
                                                 
1 Gallmetzer, R and Klamberg, M “Individual responsibility for Crimes under International Law 
The Ad Hoc Tribunals and the International Criminal Court” www.individualresponsibility.pdf 
(accessed September 2009).  
2Badar M “The Mental Element in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary from a Comparative Criminal Law Perspective” (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 
473.  
3 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 
July 1998 Entered into force on 1 July 2002. 
4 Badar (2008) 473. 
5Ambos K “General Principles Of criminal Law in the Rome Statute” (1999) 10 Criminal 
LawForum (hereafter Criminal Law Forum) 1 at 20. 
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requirement of individual criminal responsibility within Article 30 of the Rome 
Statute.6 
 
It is a principle of law that the establishment of criminal culpability requires a 
certain state of mind on the part of the perpetrator.7 That is the mental element of 
mens rea.8  Different legal systems often require different standards of mens rea. 
In common law systems, the mens rea of dolus eventualis and/or recklessness is 
sufficient to ground liability for serious crimes while in others the mere 
possibility of risk is not enough.9  
 
The Rome Statute does not define the different standards of mens rea.  The 
‘intent and knowledge’ covers dolus directus but the question is whether it 
covers dolus eventualis and/or recklessness. The Rome Statute does not mention 
dolus eventualis and/ or recklessness explicitly as one of the forms of culpability 
although article 28, the exception, provides for dolus eventualis/recklessness.10   
 
Neither the Nuremberg Charter nor the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals clearly 
defined the various standards of mens rea.11  However, the Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda ad hoc Tribunals recognised both recklessness and dolus eventualis.12 
The different standard of mens rea is therefore still the subject of much dispute. 
                                                 
6Werle G and Jessberger F “Unless Otherwise Provided: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the 
Mental Element of Crimes under International Criminal Law” (2005) 3 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (hereafter Journal of International Criminal Justice) 35 at 36. 
7 Werle G Principles of International Criminal Law (2005) 100. 
8 Badad M “Mens Rea- Mistake of Law & Mistake of Fact in German Criminal Law: A Survey 
for International Criminal Tribunal”(2005) 5 International Criminal Law Review 203 at 204. 
9 Ibid. 
10Ibid; Werle and Jessberger (2005) 47. 
11 Werle (2005) 100.  
12 Werle G and Jessberger F “Unless Otherwise Provided: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the 
Mental Element of Crimes under International Criminal Law” (2005) 3 Journal of International 
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The Lubanga13  decision is the first case of the International Criminal Court in 
which reference was made to the various standards of mens rea.14 ‘Lubanga 
Dyilo was charged with the war crimes of conscripting and enlisting children 
under the age of fifteen into an armed group and using them to participate 
actively in hostilities.’15 He was ‘alleged to be connected to the crimes as a ‘‘co-
perpetrator’’.’16 
 
This Research Paper seeks to assess whether dolus eventualis/recklessness is 
included within the structure of Article 30 of the Rome Statute.17  
 
 
1.2 Focus and objectives of the study 
 
Firstly, the study will examine the history of dolus eventualis and recklessness 
within the draft of Article 30 and why it ‘fell out of the written discourse before 
Rome.’ 18  Secondly, it will discuss the meaning of dolus eventualis and 
recklessness under common and civil legal systems. It will consider whether the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) referred to the concepts of 
                                                                                                                                   
Criminal Justice (hereafter Journal of International Criminal Justice) 35 at 53; Werle (2005) 
114. 
13 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC No. 01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on 
the confirmation of charges, 29 January 2007. 
14 Clark R S “Drafting the General Part to Penal Code: Some Thoughts inspired by the 
Negotiations on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and by the Courts first 
substantive law discussion in the Lubanga Dyilo Confirmation proceedings” (2008) 19 Criminal 
Law Forum 519 at 527. 
15 Clark (2008) 528. 
16 Clark (2008) 527. 
17 Werle and Jessberger (2005) 53. 
18 Clark (2001) 301; Clark (2008) 488. 
 
 
 
 
 4
dolus eventualis and recklessness. It will specifically discuss case law of the 
Former Yugoslavia. It will then examine the Lubanga Decision. Finally, it will 
attempt to answer the following question ‘does Article 30 of the Rome Statute 
include dolus eventualis and recklessness?’  
 
1.3 Significance of the study 
 
The research paper will examine ‘whether and to what extent dolus eventualis or 
recklessness is sufficient to establish criminal responsibility under’19 Article 30 
of the Rome Statute.  The research paper is an attempt to contribute to the 
broader understanding of dolus eventualis and recklessness in Article 30 of the 
Rome Statute.  
 
1.4 Hypothesis and research questions  
 
The study will aim to answer the following pertinent question in respect to 
criminal responsibility under Article 30 of the Rome Statute: 
Does Article 30 of the Rome Statute include dolus eventualis and recklessness? 
 
1.5 Literature survey 
 
The most relevant books for this study are the books by Bantekas, Cassese, 
Fletcher, Schabas, Snyman, Triffterer and Werle. 
 
                                                 
19 Werle and Jessberger (2005) 52. 
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“Recklessness (dolus eventualis) is defined by Cassese as, “a state of mind 
where the person foresees that his action is likely to produce its prohibited 
consequence, and nevertheless takes the risk of so acting.”20 Cassese is further 
of the opinion that although Article 30 of the Rome Statute, does not refer  
explicitly to recklessness (dolus eventualis), it may be encompassed by the 
definition of intent laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 30 of the Rome Statute.21  
 
Triffterer argues that the concepts of dolus eventualis and recklessness can be 
read within the text of Article 30 of the Rome Statute. The phrase ‘will occur’ 
may be interpreted as to include both concepts.22 
 
A number of journal articles will be used. Theses are, among others, the articles; 
of Ambos, Badar, Clark, Jessberger, and Werle.  
 
Werle and Jessberger argue that as far as the mental element is otherwise 
provided for, dolus eventualis or recklessness may legitimately be made the 
basis for culpability.23  
 
Ambos observes that the wording of Article 30 of the Rome Statute leaves no 
room for an interpretation which includes dolus eventualis and recklessness.24 
 
Authors including Eser are of the opinion that dolus eventualis and recklessness 
                                                 
20 Davidson E “United States Foreseeability, Awareness and Knowledge of the Consequences of 
the Sanctions Against Iraq” www.aldeilis.net (accessed June 2009). 
21 Cassese A International Criminal Law (2003) 73. 
22Badar (2008) 485; also Piragoff D K ‘Article 30 Mental Element’ in Triffterer O ed. (1999) 
851 at 857. 
23 Werle and Jessberger (2005) 53. 
24 Ambos (1999) 22. 
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may apply while, Hellor is of the opinion the wording in Article 30 of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court should be amended.25 
 
A number of International instruments such as ICC,26 ICTR,27 ICTY28 will be 
relied on. A study of the ad hoc Tribunal cases and the Lubanga Decision29 will 
be mainly considered for this study. A number of websites will be accessed for. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
 
This research will review the literature on the topic.  It will rely on the relevant 
primary and secondary sources relating to international criminal law and 
national criminal law. This includes the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals. The study will refer 
extensively to leading text books, articles and law journals on the topic. Other 
sources will include judgements handed down by international judicial bodies, 
comments on decisions, reports and electronic sources on the topic. This study 
adopts both critical and active research methods. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Clark (2008) 535. 
26 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 
July 1998 Entered into force on 1 July 2002. 
27 Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994) adopted 8 November 1994 
by resolution 955.  
28 Statute for: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) adopted 25 
May 1993 by resolution 827. 
29 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC No. 01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on 
the confirmation of charges, 29 January 2007. 
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1.7 Limitations of the study 
 
The scope of this research paper is confined to the mode of liability in the form 
of dolus eventualis and recklessness.  
 
This paper will engage in a discussion on the meaning of dolus eventualis and 
recklessness under common and civil legal systems. It will consider whether the 
Tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) referred to the concepts of recklessness and dolus 
eventualis. It will consist of a systematic analysis of the judgements of the ICTY, 
ICTR and the Lubanga Confimation decision. Finally, it will attempt to answer 
the following question ‘does Article 30 include dolus eventualis and 
recklessness?’  
 
1.8 Overview of chapters 
 
The study will consist of five chapters. Chapter one will provide the context in 
which the study is set. It introduces dolus eventualis and outlines the basis of the 
study. Chapter two will give a brief history of dolus eventualis and recklessness 
in the draft of Article 30. Chapter three will endeavour to define the concepts, 
dolus eventualis and recklessness. This chapter will also outline these concepts 
under common and civil legal systems. Chapter four will consider whether the 
Tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) referred to the concepts of dolus eventualis and 
recklessness. It will discuss the relevant case law of the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. It will focus on the Lubanga Decision of the ICC. Chapter five will 
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consist of a summary of the entire presentations and conclusions drawn from the 
study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2. HISTORY OF DOLUS EVENTUALIS/RECKLESSNESS 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The ad hoc tribunal created in Nuremberg after World War II set a precedent for 
the international community to hold individuals responsible for grave crimes.30 
The ad hoc criminal Tribunals were established to address the crises in former 
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.31 These Tribunals continued the pattern of holding 
individuals responsible for serious ‘breaches of human rights law such as; 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.’32 The international 
community acknowledged the desire for a permanent court rather than the ad 
hoc tribunals.33 In response to this need, the international community agreed on 
the ICC initiative.34  
 
The goal of this chapter is to give a brief history of dolus eventualis and 
recklessness in the draft of Article 30 of the Rome Statute. It will clarify why 
dolus eventualis and recklessness fell out of the written discourse before 
Rome’35  
 
 
                                                 
30 Gallmetzer R and Klamberg M “Individual responsibility for Crimes under International Law 
The Ad Hoc Tribunals and the International Criminal Court” www.individualresponsibility.pdf 
(accessed September 2009).  
31Ibid. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Kittichaisaree K International Criminal Law (2001) 28. 
35 Clark (2001) 301; also Badar (2008) 488. 
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2.2 History 
 
In 1996, the International Law Commission36 completed the Draft Code. The 
Draft Code reflects the Nuremberg Principles.37 The General Assembly 
requested the Preparatory Committee to draft the Draft Statute for the 
International Criminal Court (Draft Statute).38 The Preparatory Committee 
considered the Draft Code while drafting the Draft Statute.39 Similar to the 
ICTY and the ICTR, the Rome Statute enshrines the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility.40 The Rome Statute applies to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity.41  
 
The drafting of the Draft statute was divided into drafters of the special part and 
drafters of the general part. The drafters of the special part were mostly foreign 
officers and military lawyers. The drafters of the general part were from the 
Justice Ministries. The drafters were ignorant to what the others were drafting. 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute falls under the general part.42 
 
                                                 
36 Clark (2001) 299. 
37 Gallmetzer R and Klamberg M “Individual responsibility for Crimes under International Law 
The Ad Hoc Tribunals and the International Criminal Court” www.individualresponsibility.pdf 
(accessed September 2009).  
38 ibid. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid 61. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Clark (2008) 525. 
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In the development of an independent permanent International Criminal Court, 
the drafters of the Statute had to find common ground between different legal 
systems.43  
 
Knowledge is an important element in determining the culpable intent.44 This 
occurs when the perpetrator denies having intended the undesirable 
consequences of his conduct.45 A general rebuttable presumption in law exist 
that a ‘person intends the foreseeable consequences.’46  
 
In 1996, the Preparatory Committee included a compilation of proposals in ways 
the different legal systems could approach dolus eventualis and recklessness.47  
This compilation was entitled ‘Article H, Mens rea, Mental elements of 
crime’.48  It stated as follows: 
“1. Unless otherwise provided, a person is only criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime under this Statute if the physical elements are committed with 
intent [or] [and] knowledge [whether general or specific or as the substantive crime in 
question may specify]. 
2. For the purposes of this Statute and unless otherwise provided, a person has intent 
where: (a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the act or omission; (b) 
In relation to consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that 
it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
                                                 
43 Gallmetzer R and Klamberg M “Individual responsibility for Crimes under International Law 
The Ad Hoc Tribunals and the International Criminal Court” www.individualresponsibility.pdf 
(accessed September 2009); also Clark (2008) 525. 
44 Davidson E “United States Foreseeability, Awareness and Knowledge of the Consequences of 
the Sanctions Against Iraq” www.aldeilis.net (accessed June 2009). 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Bassiouni M C The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court (2005) 226; also 
Clark (2001) 299.   
48 Clark (2001) 299; also Bassiouni (2005) 226. 
 
 
 
 
 12
3. For the purposes of this Statute and unless otherwise provided, ‘know’, ‘knowingly’ 
or ‘knowledge’ means: 
(a) To be aware that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur; or 
(b) [To be aware that there is a substantial likelihood that a circumstance exists and 
deliberately to avoid taking steps to confirm whether that circumstance exists] [to be 
wilfully blind to the fact that a circumstance exists or that a consequence will occur.]  
4. For the purposes of this Statute and unless otherwise provided, where this Statute 
provides that a crime may be committed recklessly, a person is reckless with respect to 
a circumstance or a consequence if: 
(a) The person is aware of a risk that the circumstance exists or that the consequence 
will occur; (b) The person is aware that the risk is highly unreasonable to take; [and] (c) 
The person is indifferent to the possibility that the circumstance exists or that the 
consequence will occur”.49 
 
The mental elements in the Rome Statute are ‘intent and knowledge.’50 
The material elements relate to ‘circumstances, conduct and consequences.’51 
The ‘elements’ are the building blocks that makes up the crime.52 It is the duty 
of the prosecutor to meet the ‘onus’ by establishing any one of the elements.53  
 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute ‘contemplates that ‘unless otherwise provided’, 
there is no criminal responsibility in the absence of ‘intent and knowledge’ in 
respect of what the article calls material elements.’54 Three types of material 
                                                 
49 Bassiouni (2005) 226; See also Clark (2001) 299.   
50 Working Group on the Crime of Aggression “Elements of the Crime of Aggression” 1-12 July 
2002 PCNICC/2002/WGCA/DP.2 Proposal submitted by Samoa New York. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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elements is recognised in article 30 of the Rome Statute. Namely, ‘conduct’, 
‘consequences’ and ‘circumstances’.55 
 
‘Conduct’ refers to an act or omission and a ‘consequence’ is the result of such 
conduct. ‘Circumstances’ is a ‘crucial factor in the environment in which the 
perpetrator operates.’56 In the light of the words ‘unless otherwise provided’ at 
the beginning of article 30 of the Rome Statute, it is important to consider the 
appropriate mental element in respect of each material element of a crime.57 
 
Clark (2001) explains that the; ‘brackets in the compilation proposal indicates, 
‘disputed issues and “disputed issues” within disputed issues.’58 Many 
participants were reluctant to base criminal responsibility on dolus eventualis 
and recklessness.59 Recklessness ‘vanished’ from the Rome Statue in 1998.60 
Clark (2001) mentions, in a footnote that ultimately the Rome Statute did 
include a type of recklessness in Article 28 (b).61 Dolus eventualis also ‘fell out 
of the written discourse before Rome.’62 However, recklessness and dolus 
eventualis later became the focus of many debates. The interpretation from 
different legal systems caused much confusion.63  
 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Clark (2001) 301. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid; also Badar (2008) 488. 
61 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 
July 1998 Entered into force on 1 July 2002.Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(1998). 
62 Clark (2001) 301; also Badar (2008) 488. 
63 Ibid. 
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Article 30 (1) of the Rome Statute states that ‘unless otherwise provided’, a 
person shall be criminally responsible within the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court ‘only if the material elements are committed with intent and 
knowledge’64 Article 30(2) of the Rome Statute defines ‘intent’ in two ways. 
That is, ‘with regard to conduct and with regard to consequence.’65 On one hand, 
‘in relation to conduct that person means to engage in the conduct.’ On the other 
hand, ‘in relation to a consequence’ there is intent where ‘that person means to 
cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events.’66 ‘Knowledge’ is defined as, ‘awareness that a circumstance exists or a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events’.67 With regard to the 
consequences, ‘awareness that it will occur in the ordinary course of events’, fits 
the definitions of both intent and knowledge.68  
 
Clark (2001) observes that there was considerable debate about the conjunctive 
‘and’ between intent and knowledge.69 He concludes that the French insisted 
that both ‘intent and knowledge’ were necessary while those from common law 
jurisdictions argued that the appropriate mental element for each element had to 
be considered on its own merits.70 In particular, the term “circumstance” as it is 
also used in Article 30(3) of the Rome Statute.71  
                                                 
64 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 
July 1998 Entered into force on 1 July 2002, Article 30. 
65 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 
July 1998 Entered into force on 1 July 2002.Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court 
(1998). 
66 Shabas (2007) 225. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Clark (2001) 302. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid . 
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‘Intent and knowledge’ refers to the material elements of the crime.72 The word 
‘physical’ was changed to ‘material’ in the draft statute of 1998.73Article 30 of 
the Rome Statute assigns different levels of mental elements to each of the 
material elements in question.74 Article 30 of the Rome Statute assigns different 
levels of mental element to each of the material elements of the crime in 
question.75 This is clearly remarkable move from an ‘offence analysis approach 
to an element analysis approach.’76  
 
The Model Penal Code adopted by the American Law Institute uses ‘material’ in 
a different way. According to the Model Penal Code, section 2.02(4), the mental 
culpability must be proved with respect to each material element of the or there 
will be no conviction.77 ‘Knowledge and recklessness’ in the draft refers to the 
subjective elements.78  
 
Recklessness in Article 30(4)(b) of the draft Statute, refers to the risk being 
‘highly unreasonable.’79 This adds an objective element in that the perpetrator 
must prove awareness of unreasonableness.80 The ‘difference between 
“knowledge” and “recklessness” is that knowledge is that the circumstance 
exists or that a consequence will occur.’81 While recklessness is a question of 
being aware that ‘there is a risk a circumstance exists or that the consequence it 
                                                 
72 Werle(2005) 102. 
73 Clark (2001) 305. 
74 Piragoff D K ‘Article 30 Mental Element’ in O. Triffterer ed. (1999) 851 at 857. 
75 Badar (2008) 476. 
76 Ibid. 
77 American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code promulgated in 1962. 
78 Werle (2005) 103. 
79 Clark (2001) 205. 
80 Ibid 302. 
81 Ibid.. 
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will occur.’82 The word ‘indifference’ in Article 30(4)(c) of the Draft Statute 
confirms the subjective elements. 83 
 
One of the principal drafters of Article 30 of the Rome Statute, Piragoff, reasons 
in Triffterer, ‘that the conjunctive formulation “and” in Article 30(1) of the 
Rome Statute ensures that if knowledge of a particular circumstance is a separate 
element of the crime, the person cannot be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment unless the other material elements are also committed with intent. 
He also notes ‘that “Knowledge” is not defined with regard to “conduct” but 
only in relation to “circumstances”.’84 This creates the impression that it could 
later create misconceptions.85 According to Robinson and Grall the Model Penal 
Code (MPC) failed to define recklessness and negligence with respect to 
conduct.86  
 
The 1996 draft’s definition of ‘recklessness was, in respect to the distinction 
between an explicit use and a default rule.’87 This remained in play until the 
Rome Conference. Aside from the controversy about whether recklessness was 
an appropriate basis for responsibility, ‘paragraph 1 of the proposed draft of 
article H ultimately became the heart of Article 30 of the Rome Statute.’88 
‘Intent and knowledge’ within Article 30 of the Rome Statute was drafted as a 
default rule.89  
                                                 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86Robinson P and Grall J A “Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: TheModel Penal 
Code and Beyond” (1983) 35 Stanford Law Review 710. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
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The paragraph on recklessness in the draft Statute, included the words ‘where 
this Statute provides that a crime may be committed recklessly’ followed by a 
definition of recklessly.90 This gave the impression that it was drafted as an 
explicit use rule. However, ‘after it was pointed out that the word recklessness 
did not appear anywhere in the definitions of crimes, it was agreed that a 
definition of that concept was unnecessary.’91 It was dropped, since no explicit 
use had been made of it.92 
 
The participants responsible for drafting the statute, concluded, that the 
inclusion of these mental elements might ‘send the wrong signal in that these 
forms of culpability were sufficient for criminal liability as a general rule.’93 
These mental elements should be incorporated in individual articles that define 
the specific crimes.94  The opening words of Article 30 of the Rome Statute 
recognise that the mental elements might be provided elsewhere in the Rome 
Statute.95 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
The drafters were uncomfortable with liability based on dolus eventualis or 
recklessness.96 According to Clark, the drafters agreed upon a default rule in 
                                                 
90 Clark (2001) 295. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Piragoff (1999) 851. 
95 Piragoff (1999) 851. 
96 Clark (2001) 296. 
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Article 30 of the Draft Statute. It only applies unless there is a more specific 
provision.97 
 
The following provision was finally adopted by the Rome Conference in 1998 as 
the following: 
“Article 30 Mental element 
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements 
are committed with intent and knowledge. 
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where: 
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; 
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is 
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
3. For the purpose of this article, “knowledge” means awareness that a circumstance 
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. “Know” and 
“knowingly” shall be construed accordingly’98  
 
Each of us brings our own legal cultural experience to issues of comparative 
law.99 The use of language is also different. Clark concludes that the ‘trick is to 
make it work. It is like a sui generis piece of work. It is neither form common 
law nor is it from civil law.’100 
 
                                                 
97 Arnold R “The Mens Rea of Genocide under the Statute of the International Criminal Court” 
(2003) 14 Criminal Law Forum 127 at132; Werle and Jessberger (2005) 53. 
98 Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 
July 1998 Entered into force on 1 July 2002, Article 30.  
99 Clark (2001) 334. 
100 Clark (2008) 552. 
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However, the drafters have provided a framework which the judges of the ICC 
‘will feel compelled to use as they set out on the path of creating a new 
jurisprudence.’101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
101 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3. DISCUSSION ON DOLUS EVENTUALIS AND RECKLESSNESS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A person is considered to intend the consequence not only if he’s conscious 
objective is to cause that consequence, but also if he acts with knowledge that 
the consequence is virtually certain to occur as a result of his conduct. 102 In 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute, intent denotes two different meanings.103 The 
meaning depends on whether the material element is related to conduct or 
consequence.104 ‘A person has intent in relation to conduct, if he means to 
engage in the conduct. A person has intent in relation to consequence. A person 
is said to have intent if that person means to cause that consequence or is aware 
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.’105 
 
The goal of this chapter is to define the concepts dolus eventualis and 
recklessness. This chapter will also consider these concepts under common and 
civil legal systems. Specific reference will be given to the various theories of 
these dolus eventualis and recklessness under German Law. 
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3.2 Dolus Eventualis 
 
A person acts with dolus eventualis if he is aware that a material element 
included in the definition of a crime may result from his conduct and reconciles 
himself or ‘makes peace’ with this fact.106 The offender must reconcile himself 
with the prohibited result.107 German legal scholars are of the opinion that the 
offender must ‘seriously consider’ that the result will occur. He accepts the fact 
that his conduct could fulfil the legal elements of the offence.108 
 
3.3 Recklessness 
 
Recklessness is defined as the ‘consciously taking risk.’109 The term ‘recklessly’ 
refers to the subjective state of mind of a person. The ‘person foresees that his 
conduct may cause the prohibited act but nevertheless takes a risk of bringing it 
about.’110 The term recklessness is conscious risk taking.111 The person 
consciously takes the risk. In some civil legal systems it is distinct from 
negligent while in others it is regarded as negligence or borderlines 
negligence.112 
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3.3 Dolus eventualis/Recklessness in German Legal System 
 
In Fletcher’s (2000) analysis German law, it encompasses dolus eventualis if it 
is included within particular result.113 Fletcher (2000) defines dolus eventualis as 
“a particular subjective posture toward the result. The tests … vary; the 
possibilities include everything from being ‘indifferent’ to the result, to ‘being 
reconciled’ with the result as a possible cost of attaining one’s goal.”114 In 
German law, dolus eventualis is considered an aspect of intention and not of 
recklessness.115 However, recklessness only requires ignorance to the harmful 
consequence.116 This concept of recklessness seems similar to the Model Penal 
Code’s, which requires conscious awareness of a substantial risk.’117  
 
In Leather Belt case the Federal Supreme Court ruled that dolus eventualis 
requires the perpetrator to ‘foresee the consequence as a possible result and he 
approves it.’118 The ‘approval of the result’ can be seen as a decisive criterion 
distinguishing dolus eventualis from recklessness.119  
 
In a more recent case, the Federal Supreme Court held that in order to make a 
finding of Dolus eventualis, the perpetrator must have considered the proscribed 
result to occur. This occurrence should not to be an entirely distant possibility.120 
Intention is present if he approved of it or reconciled himself to it in order to 
                                                 
113 Fletcher G Rethinking Criminal Law (2000) 446. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Badar (2005) 224. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Fletcher (2000) 446. 
118 Badar (2005) 229. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid 27. 
 
 
 
 
 23
achieve a goal.121 The perpetrator must earnestly and not merely in an unclear 
way rely on the proscribed result not occurring.122  
 
Dolus eventualis is considered to be the usual minimum level of culpability for 
criminal liability. 123 Yet, it is the highest disputed form of intention in German 
criminal law.124 A finding of dolus eventualis may be made if the perpetrator 
was   uncertain that his conduct would lead to a specific prohibited result. The 
fact that the accused has taken a particularly great risk and even intended to 
cause a lesser form of harm will not secure a conviction based on a finding of 
dolus eventualis.125Dolus eventualis in German law is treated differently 
according to the various theories. 
 
3.4 Theories In German Law 
 
3.4.1 Consent and Approval Theory  
 
The majority of German legal scholars ascribe to this theory. They agree that, 
the perpetrator must ‘seriously consider’ that the result will occur.126 The 
offender must ‘reconcile himself’ to the prohibited result.127 This coincides with 
dolus eventualis in many other legal systems.128 
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If the perpetrator has reason to believe that ‘though he foresees it as a 
possibility’ the result will not occur, he lacks dolus eventualis.129 Knowledge 
and wilfulness must both be present. The perpetrator ‘foresees the consequences 
as possibility’ is a sufficient component of knowledge. While ‘approval’ of the 
result or to ‘reconcile himself’ is a sufficient component of wilfulness.130  
 
3.4.2 Indifference Theory 
 
 According to this theory, the perpetrator foresees the occurrence of the result as 
a possibility and is indifferent to the occurrence of the result.131 Being 
indifferent to the occurrence of the result which the perpetrator foresees as a 
possibility, constitutes the volitive element of dolus eventualis.132 This theory 
might seem similar to the ‘consent and approval theory.’133 This theory can lead 
to an acquittal if the result was highly undesired.134  
 
3.4.3 The Intellectual Theory  
 
The intellectual theory does not require the component of wilfulness. It restricts 
dolus eventualis to the intellectual component. This theory also ‘negates the 
existence of a conscious form of negligence. The intellectual theory implies that 
a distinction between dolus eventualis and negligence is unnecessary.’135  
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3.4.5 The Possibility Theory  
 
According to this theory, the perpetrator must recognise a substantial or a 
considerable possibility that the result could materialise.136 If the defendant 
foresees or recognises the result as ‘concretely possible’ he acts with dolus 
eventualis.137 If the perpetrator seriously believed that the prohibited result will 
not occur or did not accept this result, he will still possess (dolus eventualis).138 
 
3.4.6 The Probability Theory  
 
This theory is contrary to the ‘possibility theory’. The ‘probability theory’ 
requires awareness of a higher degree of risk.139 The result must have been 
considered to be likely. The perpetrator acts with dolus eventualis, if he 
‘foresees that the occurrence of the prohibited result is probable.’140 ‘Probable’ 
is defined as being ‘more than possible.141  
 
3.4.7 Frank Formula  
 
The Frank Formula is not considered to be a proper definition of dolus 
eventualis. It is merely means to inquire into the mental states of an offender.142 
According to Frank Formula if the perpetrator is aware of the possibility of the 
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circumstance or consequence then the proper inquiry into the mental state of the 
offender is then followed.143  
 
The German courts favour the ‘consent and approval theory’. According to the 
jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court, acting with dolus eventualis 
requires that the perpetrator perceive the occurrence of the criminal result as 
possible.144 The criminal result should not be completely remote.145 In 
conclusion, he acts with dolus eventualis if he foresees the possibility and 
reconciles himself to that possibility.146 
 
3.5 Dolus eventualis/Recklessness in the French Legal System 
 
French criminal law gives intent a very different meaning than English common 
law.147 The nineteenth century French criminal lawyer, Emile Garçon provides a 
classic definition of general intent: 
 
“Intent, in its legal sense, is the desire to commit a crime as defined by the law; it is the 
accused’s awareness that he is breaking a law.”148 
 
 In French criminal law a distinction is made between two forms of intent. 
Namely, intent to act unlawfully and special intent that needs to be proved for 
certain offences. The term intent in French criminal law means the deliberate 
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intention to commit a wrong. It involves both ‘knowledge’ that something is 
prohibited and the ‘deliberate willingness’ to carry out the proscribed conduct.149  
Elliot (2000) explains that general intent is ‘criminal awareness and desire.150 
Awareness simply requires the perpetrator to be aware that the act is unlawful.151 The 
perpetrator must also understand the unlawful act is the same as described in the 
criminal code.152 The ‘element of desire refers to the perpetrators willingness to 
commit the wrongful act and not the desire to accomplish the result of the act in 
question.’153It appears that in French law the perpetrator need not reconcile 
himself with the possibility of the result occurring. The perpetrator has to 
understand that the act is unlawful and the perpetrator must be willing to 
accomplish this unlawful act.  
 
3.6 Dolus eventualis/Recklessness in Italy 
 
Under the Italian criminal law all serious crimes require proof of the mental 
element known as dolus.154 This implies that the prohibited result must be both 
foreseen and willed.155 Badar (2008) observes that, according to the Italian 
criminal law a result may be wanted or willed even though it is not desired.156 
The perpetrator act with dolus eventualis, if the conduct of the perpetrator brings 
about the contemplated possibility of the prohibited result and the perpetrator is 
prepared to run the risk. The perpetrator still acts with dolus eventualis even if a 
small risk is wanted or willed. The perpetrator needs to reconcile him with the 
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possibility or accept it as a part of the price he is prepared to pay to secure his 
objective.157 
 
3.7 Dolus eventualis/Recklessness in South African law 
 
In South African law, dolus eventualis is a form of intention different to 
‘intention’ in its ordinary sense.158 Snyman (2002) explains that some writers 
refer to this type of intent as ‘constructive intention.’159 Dolus eventualis 
consists of two components. Namely; the ‘perpetrator subjectively foresees the 
possibility that in striving towards his main aim, the unlawful act may be 
committed or the unlawful result may ensue and he reconciles himself to this 
possibility.’160    
 
The perpetrator should foresee the possibility of the result and he should also 
reconcile himself to this possibility.161 The foreseeability aspect is described as 
the ‘cognitive part while the reconciling aspect is the conative or volitional’ part 
this concept.162  According to Snyman (2002) the term possibility in this context 
may be a ‘strong possibility, a slight, remote or even exceptional.’163 Snyman 
(2002) submits that dolus eventualis is absent if the perpetrator foresees the 
possibility only as remote or far fetched. If any normal person foresees that there 
is a remote or exceptional possibility that an everyday activity may lead to an 
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unlawful act, it does not mean that there is dolus eventualis.164 Dolus eventualis 
is not limited to cases where the result is foreseen as to cases where the result is 
foreseen as a strong possibility. The correct approach is to assume that there 
must be a substantial or reasonable possibility that the result may ensue.165 
  
The fact, that the perpetrator foresees the result as a substantial possibility, still 
does not ensure the presence of dolus eventualis.166  Dolus eventualis is only 
present if the perpetrator reconciles him to the possibility that the result may 
follow. This can be compared to the ‘possibility theory’ in German law.167 This 
means if the perpetrator acts even though he foresees the possibility of the 
prohibited result. To him it is therefore immaterial whether the result flows from 
his actions or not.168 He does not allow himself to be deterred by the prospect of 
the forbidden result flowing from his act. He acts reckless in respect of the 
prohibited result. By reckless it means that the perpetrator consciously accepts 
the risk.169  
 
Snyman (2002) agrees with various writers, that the volitional element is 
‘redundant and that all that is required for dolus eventualis is subjective 
foresight of the possibility of the result, provided that the possibility is not too 
remote.’170 The possibility should be substantial.  However, the courts in South 
Africa do not follow this view of dolus eventualis. They favour the approach 
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which includes the volitional element. In Ngubane171 the court considered the 
view of only subjective foresight but held that ‘the distinguishing feature of 
dolus eventualis is the volitional component. The perpetrator consents to the 
consequence foreseen as a possibility and he reconciles him to the possibility, he 
takes it into the bargain.’172 The perpetrator acts with dolus eventualis. 
 
3.7 Dolus eventualis/Recklessness in US Law 
 
At common law, there was much confusion with regard to the concept of mens 
rea and specifically recklessness.173 Davids (1981) explains that ‘courts used a 
large variety of terms to establish fault without defining concepts.’174 Due to 
lack of definitions terms such as wilful, wanton, negligence, culpable negligence, 
gross negligence, these terms were used interchangeably with recklessness. The 
terms negligence and recklessness might also be given different meanings in 
different states or depending on the crime involved.175 Rather than attempting to 
undo the confusion of common law, the drafters of the Model Penal Code 
abandoned most of the common law terminology.176 The confusion of 
terminology has been ‘especially great when dealing with fault that has not been 
viewed as intentional.’177 
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In civil law it is common to impose fault for unintentional behaviour as long as 
it is negligent, given the different purposes of criminal law.178 It is usually 
agreed upon, that ‘something more than ordinary civil negligence should be 
required for criminal liability.’179 
  
It was left to the courts to describe the difference between ‘fault required for 
involuntary manslaughter and civil or tort negligence.’180 One approach that 
required this conduct, comprise more than an ordinary difference from the 
standard of care of a reasonable person.181 Another approach focused on the 
perpetrators awareness that his conduct was causing the risk. Awareness of the 
risk in distinguishing criminal from civil liability was justified by the view that 
‘engaging in conduct while actually aware of a risk is more evil or criminally 
culpable than engaging in the same conduct while unaware of the risk.’182 
 
The Model Penal Code requires gross deviation for negligence and recklessness 
and additionally requires for recklessness the subjective awareness of the risk of 
harm.183 The common law interpretations were frequently unclear. Some states 
defined ‘culpable or gross negligence as requiring a subjective standard while 
others treated it as an objective standard.’184 Some states requiring more than 
criminal negligence used the term reckless but defined it objectively.185 
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The Model Penal Code definitions of culpability eliminated much of the 
common law confusion. For the variety of terms used for fault in regard to 
unintentional results or lack of knowledge of circumstances has been reduced to 
two: recklessness and negligence form wanton, wicked, evil or other undefined 
terms.186 
 
The model code defines ‘recklessness and negligence so that judicial 
interpretations which resulted in so many different interpretations is no longer 
necessary.187 
 
The Model Penal Code has clearly distinguished recklessness from negligence 
by requiring subjective awareness of the risk. The code also makes it clear that 
recklessness like negligence requires more than an ordinary deviation from the 
standard of care of a reasonable person. According to Article 2(2)( c) of the US 
Model Penal Code, ‘a person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a 
circumstance described by a statute defining an offence when he is aware of and 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will 
occur or that such circumstances exist. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of 
conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation’.188 
 
The code provides that a person acts ‘recklessly’ if he ‘consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustified risk that the material element exits or will result from 
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his conduct’.189 The risk is ‘substantial and unjustifiable’ if ‘considering the 
nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, 
its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’190 
 
Many questions regarding recklessness remain. The codes definition of 
recklessness includes the negligence and knowledge. Recklessness falls between 
knowingly and negligence. Recklessness requires only an awareness of a risk of 
existence of facts or awareness a risk will occur.191 
 
According to Badar (2008) in United States v. Albers, the court held that a 
finding of recklessness may only be made when persons disregard a risk of harm 
of which they are aware. The requirement that the actor consciously disregard 
the risk is the most significant part of the definition of recklessness. It is this 
concept which differentiates recklessness from dolus eventualis.192 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
Hellor (2009) explains that Jescheck, a former President of the International 
Association of Penal Law, usually utilizes the theory of consent to define dolus 
eventualis.193 The perpetrator must have consented to the result or at least take 
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it into consideration.194 Hellor (2009) quotes the following: ‘More accurate, and 
corresponding more closely to the psychological state of the actor in case of 
uncertainty as to the realization of the non-desired result, is a recent theory 
requiring for dolus eventualis that the actor believed the result seriously 
possible and reconciled himself with that possibility.;195  
To ‘reconcile’ one with a possible result is to accept the possible result. The 
familiar cliché, if it happens, live with it.  Dolus eventualis can also include 
indifference and foresight to the possible result as explained by Fletcher.196  
   
In some legal systems whether it is common law or civil law, the concept of 
recklessness is not different from the concept of dolus eventualis. However, this 
is not always so. In Celebic the defence submitted that the words ‘reckless’ and 
‘intent’ are mutually exclusive. In the common law legal systems offences 
requiring intent are distinguished from those where mere recklessness will 
suffice.197 The legal systems analysed in this paper requires the volitional 
element, dolus eventualis.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4. THE ICTY, ICTR AND LUBANGA CONFRIMATION DECISION   
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The Yugoslavia Tribunal has employed different degrees of mens rea in order to 
determine culpability. Dolus eventualis and recklessness is used by the ICTY 
interchangeably198. According to the ICTY both dolus eventualis and 
recklessness require the ‘risk assessment.’199 This chapter will consider 
recklessness and dolus eventualis within the Tribunals (ICTY and ICTR). It will 
specifically discuss the first case of the ICC in which the degrees of culpability 
was considered namely; the Lubanga confirmation decision.  
 
4.2 ICTY CASE LAW  
 
In Blaskic the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY discussed and analysed 
recklessness.200 According to the ICTY the mens rea standard required for a 
conviction in which planning, instigating, and ordering is that of ‘indirect 
intent.’201 The ‘Appellant submitted that ‘indirect intent’ is identical to 
recklessness and/or to dolus eventualis.’202  
 
In order to support this notion, the ICTY came to the conclusion that: 
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‘In common law systems, the mens rea of recklessness is sufficient to ground 
liability for serious crimes such as murder or manslaughter … According to the 
Model Penal Code … the degree of risk involved must be substantial and 
unjustifiable; a mere possibility of risk is not enough. Examining some of the 
major common law jurisdictions the Appeals Chamber concluded that the 
adequate mens rea of recklessness requires the awareness of a risk that the 
result or consequence will occur or will probably occur, and that the risk must 
be unjustifiable or unreasonable. Mere possibility of a risk that a crime or 
crimes will occur as a result of the actor’s conduct generally does not suffice to 
trigger criminal responsibility.’203  
 
The ICTY explained that, the concept of dolus eventualis in civil law systems 
may constitute the requisite mens rea for serious crimes. The ICTY considered 
the jurisprudence of France, Italy and Germany. A finding of dolus eventualis 
requires the perpetrator to foresee the possibility and accept the possible 
consequences. The ICTY stated ‘that in the case of extremely dangerous, violent 
acts, it is obvious that the perpetrator takes into account the possibility of the 
victim’s death and since he continues to carry out the act, accepts such a result. 
The volitional element denotes the borderline between dolus eventualis and 
advertent or conscious negligence.’204  
 
The Appeals Chamber concluded upon examination of national systems as well 
as International Tribunal approaches that the mere knowledge of any kind of risk 
does not trigger criminal responsibility for serious violations of international 
                                                 
203 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic 2000 IT-95-14-A at para34. 
204 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic 2000 IT-95-14-T at para 39. 
 
 
 
 
 37
humanitarian law.205 This means that an awareness of a higher likelihood of risk 
and a volitional element must be incorporated in the legal standard of dolus 
eventualis.206 The Appeals Chamber concluded with the following:  ‘A person 
who orders an act or omission with the awareness of the substantial likelihood 
that a crime will be committed in the execution of that order, has the requisite 
mens rea for establishing liability under Article 7(1) pursuant to ordering. 
Ordering with such awareness has to be regarded as accepting that crime.’  
 
The finding of the Appeals Chamber coincides with the ‘consent and approval 
theory’ as recognised by both German literature and jurisprudence. However, 
Badar (2005) still questions the immediacy of the risk, the degree of foresight or 
the assessment of the probability of the risk remains to be resolved.207  
 
In Celebic the ICTY dealt with atrocities committed in early May 1992 when 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats took control of Bosnian Serb villages in the Konjic 
municipality. Men and women were taken to a facility that came to be known as 
the Celibici camp.208  
 
The Trial Chamber in Celebic examined the requisite mens rea of murder in 
different common law countries.209 The Trial Chamber considered the mens rea 
requirement in Australia. According to Australia ‘knowledge’ that death or 
grievous bodily harm will probably result from the actions of the accused is the 
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requisite test.210 Under Canadian law, the accused is required to have a 
simultaneous awareness of the probability of death and the intention to inflict 
some form of serious harm. The same position applies in Pakistan.211 Badar 
asserts that ‘knowledge’ is not a notion familiar to civil law countries but is 
considered by some of the common law countries like the UK as having the 
same value and intensity as intent. According to Badar ‘a statute may require 
knowledge by requiring intention, but it may also require knowledge by 
explicitly employing that word, or one of its grammatical variants. The offence 
of knowingly possessing explosives is an example of an express requirement of 
knowledge’.212  
 
According to Cassese, ‘in some common law countries, ‘Knowledge’ denotes 
two different forms of mental states, depending on the contents of the 
substantive penal rule at stake: if the substantive penal rule prescribes the 
existence of a particular fact or circumstance for the crime to materialize, 
knowledge means awareness of the existence of this fact or circumstance; if 
instead the substantive criminal rule focuses on the result of one’s conduct, then 
knowledge means awareness that one’s actions is most likely to bring about the 
harmful result, and nevertheless taking the high risk of causing that result.’213 
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Williams on the other hand considers ‘that in such legislation, the requirement of 
knowledge is generally interpreted as applying to all the circumstances of the 
offence, unless the statute makes the contrary meaning plain’.214  
  
In the Celebici, the trial Chamber considered a unified definition for the 
requisite mens rea of murder by referring to civil law countries. The Trial 
Chamber stated that ‘The civil law concept of dolus describes the voluntariness 
of an act and incorporates both direct and indirect intention. Under the theory of 
indirect intention (dolus eventualis), should an accused engage in life-
endangering behaviour, his killing is deemed intentional if he “makes peace” 
with the likelihood of death. In many civil law jurisdictions the foreseeability of 
death is relevant and the possibility that death will occur is generally sufficient 
to fulfil the requisite intention to kill.’215 
 
The Trial Chamber also considered the term ‘wilful’ and reached the conclusion 
that it is a form of intent that includes ‘recklessness’ as understood in common 
law jurisdictions but excludes ordinary negligence. Therefore recklessness or 
dolus eventualis are sufficient mens rea standards to trigger the criminal 
responsibility for murder or wilful killing.216 
 
In Stakic the Trial Chamber had to establish the requisite mens rea for the crime 
of murder as a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War under Article 3 of the 
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ICTY Statute.217 The Yugoslavia Tribunal understood dolus eventualis as the 
following:  ‘if the actor engages in life-endangering behaviour, his killing 
becomes intentional if he ‘‘reconciles himself’’ or ‘‘makes peace’’ with the 
likelihood of death’.218 According to the ICTY this is referred to the technical 
meaning of dolus eventualis.219 If however the perpetrator is ‘confident’ and has 
reason to believe that the result ‘though he foresees it as a possibility’ will not 
occur, he lacks dolus eventualis.  Dolus eventualis should include the two 
components of intent namely ‘knowledge and wilfulness’. If one of these 
components is missing then dolus eventualis does not exist.220 According to the 
Stakic dolus eventualis is sufficient to establish the requisite mental state of a 
crime.221    
 
Thus, in the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal the mens rea of the offence of 
extermination is satisfied by either dolus directus or dolus eventualis. Mere 
recklessness is excluded.222 This would correspond with the ‘consent and approval 
theory’. 
 
In Oric the Trial Chamber asserted that individual criminal responsibility for 
serious crimes over which the ICTY has jurisdiction requires intention. The 
Trial Chamber concluded that intent does not include recklessness.223 In the 
words of the Orić Judgment, ‘intention contains a cognitive element of 
knowledge and a volitional element of acceptance …’  ‘Knowledge’ on the part 
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of the perpetrator is not sufficient to trigger the criminal liability for individuals 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law. Therefore recklessness 
would not suffice.224 In Galic the Trial Chamber required the Prosecution to 
prove that the defendant was aware or should have been aware of the status of 
the persons attacked. 225  
 
In Tadic, the ICTY held, ‘ what is required is that, under the circumstances of 
the case it was foreseeable that a non-concerted crime might be perpetrated by or 
on other members of a group or collectively jointly pursuing a criminal intent 
and the accused unconsciously and deliberately took that risk’.226 In other words 
Tadić was aware of this risk but nevertheless willingly participated in the 
common plan. 227 In Jelisic  the prosecutor submitted: ‘that an accused need not 
seek the destruction in whole or in part of a group and that it suffices that he 
knows that his acts will inevitably, or even only probably, result in the 
destruction of the group in question.’228 This notion was rejected and it was 
considered to be constructive knowledge. This form of intention was insufficient 
to establish the mental element of genocide.229 This argument was also used in 
Krstic.230 Recklessness or dolus eventualis is insufficient to establish criminal 
responsibility for genocide.231 
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4.3 ICTR CASE LAW 
 
 In Kayishema the mens rea, can be divided into two subjective thresholds. 232 
Namely; ‘the superior must have actual knowledge with regard to the crimes; or 
he must possess information putting him on notice of the risk of such crimes, 
which indicates a need for additional investigation to determine whether crimes 
were committed or were about to be committed.’233  The accused had to be 
‘aware that his act or omission formed part of mass killing attack.’234  
 
4.7 Lubanga Confirmation Decision 
 
The Lubanga Confirmation decision235 was the first time that the ICC had to 
consider dolus eventualis and recklessness within Article 30 of the Rome Statute 
Lubanga Dyilo was charged with war crimes of conscripting and enlisting 
children under the age of fifteen into an armed group and using them to 
participate actively in hostilities.236  
 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was transferred to the ICC in March 2006. He was a 
founder and prominent leader of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC), a 
group politically active since 2000 in Ituri a village in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC). Lubanga played a leading role in the military organisation. 
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The military organisation in 2002 became engaged in armed conflict with 
rivalling groups.237  
 
Thomas Lubanga was alleged to be connected to the crimes as a ‘co-
perpetrator.’ The Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) found that a crime can be described 
in terms of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ elements. The subjective elements refer 
to the mental element.238  
 
The PTC discusses the subjective elements. Article 30 of the Rome Statute 
encompasses the ‘volitional element’. The PTC made reference to ‘intent and 
knowledge’ with Article 30 of the Rome Statue. ‘Intention and knowledge’ is 
used in a conjunctive way.239 It requires the existence of a volitional element on 
the part of the suspect. ‘Volition’ is used here in the sense of an attitude towards 
the result. The ‘volitional element’ encompasses other forms of dolus.  The PTC 
was aware that the two ad hoc Tribunals has recognised other degrees of intent 
other than direct intent. According the PTC the volitional element encompasses 
dolus eventualis.240  
 
The PTC agreed that dolus eventualis applies in situations in which the suspect 
is aware of the risk and accepts such an outcome by reconciling himself or 
consenting to it. The Pre-Trial Chamber found it necessary to distinguish 
between being aware of the risk and accepting the outcome by reconciling 
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himself or consenting to it.241 This refers to dolus eventualis. As dolus eventualis 
and recklessness were dropped out of the Rome Statute, the PTC had to consider 
an interpretation of the Statute.242  
 
The PTC referred to the ‘unless otherwise’ provision in Article 30 of the Rome 
Statute. According to the PTC, the Elements of Crime in article 8 of the Rome 
Statute provides for the requirements of the objective elements of war crimes.243 
That is conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years and 
using them to participate actively in hostilities.244 The third element listed in the 
elements of crimes for these specific crimes requires in relation to the age of the 
victims, ‘the perpetrator knew or should have known that such persons were 
under the age of 15yrs.’245 The PTC regarded this as an exceptional instance in 
which article 30 of the Rome Statute as a default rule can be used.246   
 
The PTC clarified this further by saying, that if there is a likelihood that it ‘will 
occur in the ordinary course of events’ and the perpetrator accepts the idea of 
bringing about the act, the material elements of the crime can be inferred.247 It 
can be inferred from ‘the awareness by the suspect of the substantial likelihood 
that due to his actions that the objective elements of the crime will be 
realised.’248 It can also be inferred from the suspect’s decision to carry out the 
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act despite such awareness.249 The PTC asserted that by requiring the existence 
of a volitional element in the sense of accepting the consequence the civil law 
concept of dolus eventualis is more appropriate. They ruled out the common law 
recklessness as it fell short of meeting the mens rea threshold as set out in 
Article 30.250  
 
The Lubanga PTC provided further clarification as to the reason for ruling out 
recklessness from Article 30 of the Rome Statute:  
‘The concept of recklessness requires only that the perpetrator be aware of the existence of a risk 
that the objective elements of the crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, but does 
not require that he or she reconcile himself or herself with the result. In so far as recklessness, it 
does not require the suspect to reconcile himself with the causation of the objective elements of 
the crime as a result of his or her actions or omissions, it is not part of the concept of 
intention.’251  
 
The Court notes that, in respect of the victims, ‘the perpetrator knew or should 
have known that such person or persons were under the age of 15 years.’252 
Triffeterer (2003)253 supports this argument. According the Triffeterer (2003) 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute encompasses dolus eventualis and recklessness. 
This can be inferred from the language in Article 30 of the Rome Statute. 
Namely; aware that a circumstance exists or a consequence  
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‘will occur’. Triffeterer (2003) makes reference, to the fact that ‘will occur’ is 
different to ‘may occur’.254 
 
Ambos (1999), disagrees with the above view by stating the following: 
 
‘Certainly, reckless conduct cannot be the basis of responsibility since a corresponding 
provision was deleted. The same applies for the higher threshold of dolus 
eventualis: this is a kind of ‘‘conditional intent’’ by which a wide range of subjective 
attitudes towards the result are expressed and, thus, implies a higher threshold than 
recklessness. The perpetrator may be indifferent to the result or be ‘‘reconciled’’ with 
the harm as a possible cost of attaining his or her goal... In such situations of dolus 
eventualis the perpetrator is not, as required by Article 30(2)(b), aware that a certain 
result or consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. He or she 
only thinks that the result is possible. Thus, the wording of Article 30 hardly leaves 
room for an interpretation which includes dolus eventualis within the concept of 
intent as a kind of ‘‘indirect intent’.’255 
 
Ambos (1999) argues that dolus eventualis is a conditional intent similar to that 
referred to by some South African legal scholars. Dolus eventualis implies 
higher threshold than recklessness. The perpetrator has to reconcile him with the 
result of the possibility while recklessness the perpetrator need only be aware of 
a substantial risk. Ambos (1999) explains that the wording of article 30 of the 
Rome Statute requires the perpetrator to think of the possible result and not that 
the perpetrator must reconcile him with the possibility of the consequence.256 
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4.9 Conclusion   
 
The concept of recklessness according to the ICTY just as with the continental 
law dolus eventualis requires some sort of acceptance on the part of the accused 
of the risk that he has recognized and some sort of decision to act in spite of that 
risk. This decision to ‘act anyway’ can also be interpreted as equivalent to the 
‘manifest indifference’.257 The decision to ‘act anyway’ displays a ‘complete 
disregard’ for the outcome of the conduct. According to various writers the 
question of the degree of foresight or the assessment of the probability of the 
risk remains unclear.258  
 
According to the Stakic Judgment, if the perpetrator shows that he was aware of 
the nature of the attack, he is considered to posses the discriminatory intent 
without further evidence.259 However, according to Ambos (1999), ‘awareness 
of the circumstances does not necessarily imply the existence of intention.’260 
It may, however, ‘be a fact, when considered with all the other evidence, lead to 
an inference that the perpetrator possesses the discriminatory intent.’261 This 
could explain the finding in Lubanga Confirmation decision. 
 
The Blaskic Appeals Chamber asserted that ‘an awareness of a higher likelihood 
of risk and a volitional element must be incorporated in the legal standard’.262 
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The findings rendered by the Celebici Trial Chamber on the law of ‘wilful 
killing’ and ‘murder’ support this notion.263  
 
Different legal systems utilise differing forms of classification of the mental 
element, it is clear that some form of intention is required. However, this intention 
may be inferred from the circumstances whether one approaches the issue from the 
perspective of the foreseeability as a consequence of the acts of perpetrator or the 
taking of an excessive risk which demonstrates recklessness.264 
 
Badar (2006) asserts that the ‘absence of a general provision on the mental 
element in the ICTY Statute left the door open to the jurisprudence of this 
Tribunal to provide, on an ex post facto basis, the elements of criminal 
responsibility.’265 It therefore requires judicial discretion. 266  Similarly, the same 
is considered in the Lubanga Confirmation decision.  
 
Bassiouni observed that  
‘The judicial process in the cases of the IMT, IMTFE, ICTY and ICTR was, for all 
practical purposes, an intuitive judicial method of ascertaining and applying what they 
believe to be part of general principles of law. The term intuitive means that the judges 
in a given case acting on the basis of their knowledge and individual research,  reach a 
conclusion without following a method recognized in comparative criminal law 
technique. The haphazard nature of the process, however, did not necessarily exclude 
the reaching of correct outcomes which are consonant with what a proper methodology 
would have reached. But that also meant that the process was unpredictable and the 
outcomes not always consistent with a given theory of law. The absence of pre-existing 
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norms of a general part also meant that the prosecution was frequently uncertain as to 
what it had to prove, and the defence equally uncertain as to its ability to challenge it, or 
advance argument for exoneration.’267 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute states: ‘unless otherwise provided, a person shall 
be criminally liable for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the 
material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.’268 It is therefore, 
inevitable to conclude that where there is no reference made in the Elements of 
Crimes to a mental element, Article 30 of the Rome Statute acts as a default 
rule.269 
 
In the Lubanga Confirmation decision, that there was a nexus to the armed 
conflict and the material elements contained in all of the war crimes provisions 
of The Elements. With respect to the existence of an armed conflict, the PTC 
noted, the perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict. As for the mens rea standards under article 30 of 
the Rome Statute, the PTC interpreted that article 30 includes three categories of 
dolus. Namely, dolus directus and dolus eventualis.270 
 
Eight years prior to the Lubanga confirmation decision Cassese expressed his 
concerns about exclusion of dolus eventualis and recklessness by the drafters of 
the Rome Statute. Cassese noted, that he fails to see why recklessness would not 
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suffice in war crimes.271  He agrees that crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and aggression, can only be perpetrator with intent and knowledge. 
However, for less serious crimes, such as war crimes, current international law 
must be taken to allow for recklessness.272 Cassese continued his criticism 
regarding the exclusion of recklessness as a culpable mental element under the 
Rome Statute in the following words: 
‘Hence, on this score the Rome Statute marks a step backwards with respect to lex lata, 
and possibly creates a loophole: persons responsible for war crimes, when they acted 
recklessly, may be brought to trial and convicted before national courts, while they 
would be acquitted by the ICC. It would seem that the draughtsmen have unduly 
expanded the shield they intended to provide to the military’.  
 
Since the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Article 30 has been subject to different interpretations by legal scholars and 
commentators. However, one of the major advantages of Article 30 of the Rome 
Statue assigns different levels of culpability to each of the material element of 
the crimes under the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC.  
 
The study reveals that there are exceptions regarding the application of the 
default rule of intent and knowledge to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court. Article 30 of the Rome Statute can be applied on 
an ad hoc basis.273 According to Badar (2008), if a particular definition of a 
crime is silent as to the requisite mental element, Article 30 can import the 
mental elements of ‘intent and knowledge’ as being the mental elements 
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required, in order to render an accused criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment for that particular crime.274  
 
According to Badar (2008) this view is not shared by all writers. According to 
Schabas, ‘several crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC have 
their own built-in mens rea requirement.’275 ICC judges have to consider Article 
30 as a default rule that is applied to all crimes and modes of participation in 
criminal conduct.276 However, there should be no specific rules expressly stated 
in these provisions.277 Piragoff (1999) has a different opinion.278 He notes that 
the inclusion of these adjectives is unnecessary. He believes that these terms, is 
merely due to the negotiation process. The drafters were determined to ensure 
that the ‘intentional nature’ of these crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC is 
understood.279 However, it is important to note Article 66 of the Rome Statue 
stipulates: ‘in order to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the 
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.’280 Denying such a fundamental 
principle which the most significant factor in determining criminal liability, is 
still a complex area in international criminal law.281 The terms legislatures use 
are sometimes vague and unclear.282 
 
Glanville Williams commented “A layman might find it painfully ridiculous that, 
after a thousand of years of legal development, lawyers should still be arguing 
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about the expressions used to denote basic ideas of our Legal systems” he also 
wrote “English judges tend to eschew general definitions and merely use the 
words denoting legal concepts. Unfortunately, the desire of the judges to achieve 
particular results in particular leads them too often to warp a concept in order to 
meet the exigency of the moment……”283 
 
As Williams explains that to the ordinary lay person the legal jargon can be 
treacherous. The legal system has been development over thousand of years and 
the ordinary person would expect concepts that are applicable to all legal 
systems. In answering question, whether dolus eventualis/ recklessness is 
included in article 30 of the Rome Statute, one has to answer it with caution. It 
can definitely be confirmed that recklessness is not included in article 30 of the 
Rome Statute. The study has illustrated this; in terms of case law of the ICTR, 
ICTY and the ICC’s first decision. Namely; the Lubanga Confirmation decision. 
 
However, dolus eventualis creates a cross roads. On one hand, it would be 
totally unfair if the perpetrator is found guilty as to a finding of dolus eventualis 
under the perpetrators own domestic system and on the other hand, be acquitted 
by the ICC. According to Cassesse as previously noted, this would be a step 
backwards and not in favour of developing international criminal law.  
 
In drafting Article 30, the codifiers of the ICC Statute have achieved several 
goals.284 Article 30 sets a general requirement for international criminal liability 
which is based on ‘intent and knowledge.’285 The ‘unless otherwise provided’ 
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‘enables the Statute to absorb the corresponding rules of international 
humanitarian law without having to modify the definitions of these crimes.’286 
An example of this is the crime of genocide. It has the same definition in the 
1948 Genocide Convention.287 
 
The presumption of innocence288 is a fundamental principle in almost all legal 
systems. The dispute over article 30 of the Rome statute should not allow this 
principle to be taken lightly. I have to agree with many of the writers mentioned 
in this study that dolus eventualis neither recklessness is provided for in article 
30 of the Rome Statute but could be considered as a default rule. 
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